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Abstract—With the inception of IPv6 it is possible to assign
a unique ID to each device on planet. Recently, wireless sensor
networks and traditional IP networks are more tightly integrated
using IPv6 and 6LoWPAN. Real-world deployments of WSN
demand secure communication. The receiver should be able to
verify that sensor data is generated by trusted nodes and/or
it may also be necessary to encrypt sensor data in transit.
Available IPv6 protocol stacks can use IPsec to secure data
exchanges. Thus, it is desirable to extend 6LoWPAN such that
IPsec communication with IPv6 nodes is possible. It is beneficial
to use IPsec because the existing end-points on the Internet do
not need to be modified to communicate securely with the WSN.
Moreover, using IPsec, true end-to-end security is implemented
and the need for a trustworthy gateway is removed.
In this demo we will show the usage of our implemented
lightweight IPsec. We will show how IPsec ensures end-to-
end security between an IP enabled sensor networks and the
traditional Internet. This is the first compressed lightweight
design, implementation, and evaluation of a 6LoWPAN extension
for IPsec. This demo complements the full paper that will appear
in the parent conference, DCOSS’11.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers have unanimous consensus that security is very
important for the future IP based WSN and its integration with
the traditional Internet. Due to its unlimited address space,
IPv6 is the obvious choice for these networks [1]. IPv6 over
Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) [2]
enables carrying of IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4 net-
works. This enables the integration of IPv6 connected wireless
sensor networks with existing IP based infrastructures. Sensor
nodes using 6LoWPAN can directly communicate with IPv6
enabled hosts and, for example, sensor data processing can
be performed by standard servers. Thus, 6LoWPAN greatly
simplifies operation and integration of WSNs in existing IT
infrastructures.
6LoWPAN today relies on the IEEE 802.15.4 (referred to
as 802.15.4 in the following) link-layer which provides data
encryption and integrity checking. This solution is appealing
since it is independent of the network protocols and is cur-
rently supported by the hardware of 802.15.4 radio chips.
However, such link-layer mechanism only ensures hop-by-
hop security where every node in the communication path
(including the 6LoWPAN gateway) has to be be trusted, and
where neither host authentication nor key management is
supported. Furthermore, messages leaving the sensor network
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Fig. 1: We propose to use IPsec to secure the communication
between sensor nodes in 6LoWPANs and hosts in an IPv6-
enabled Internet. IPsec provides E2E security using existing
methods and infrastructures.
and continuing to travel on an IP network are not protected
by link-layer security mechanisms.
The IPsec protocol suite, mandated by IPv6, provides end-
to-end security for any IP communication [3]. Unlike hop-
by-hop solutions, it includes a key exchange mechanism
and provides authentication in addition to confidentiality and
integrity. By operating at the network-layer, it can be used
with any transport protocols, including potential future ones.
Furthermore, it ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
transport-layer headers (as well as the integrity of IP headers),
which cannot be done with a higher-level solution like TLS.
For these reasons, researchers [4], [5], [6] and 6LoWPAN
standardizations groups [2] consider IPsec a potential security
solution for IP based sensornets, providing secure communi-
cations between Internet hosts and sensor nodes, as illustrated
in Figure 1.
Our IPsec implementation the Contiki OS supports both
AH and ESP protocols. It includes several standard encryp-
tion/authentication algorithms such as SHA1, AES-XCBC,
AES-CBC or AES-CTR. IPsec requires both pre-shared key
and certificate based mechanism for creating security associa-
tion in IPsec. This means that every standard implementation
of IPsec supports pre-shared key mechanisms, as we use in
our implementation and in this demo. We intend to evaluate
the suitability of certificate based automatic key exchange
mechanisms in future.
This demonstration comes as a complement to the pa-
per entitled Securing Communication in 6LoWPAN with
Compressed IPsec that will appear in the parent conference,
DCOSS’11 [7].
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Fig. 2: The demonstration setup consisting of a standard Linux
machine, border router, and two hop 6LoWPAN network.
Lena’s picture is secured in a end-to-end manner thanks to
IPsec.
II. DEMONSTRATION DESCRIPTION
The purpose of our demonstration is to illustrate in a visual
way the transport of confidential data over a low-power sensor
network using lightweight IPsec ESP. We have implemented
AH as well but this demo shows only ESP [8], which provides
origin authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality protection of
IP packets.
Our setup consists of a PC running out-of-the box Linux
IPsec implementation, connected to a small sensornet, as
illustrated in Figure 2. The network is made of Tmote sky,
based on a 16-bits msp430 processor, with 10 kb RAm and
48 kb EEPROM. All motes have their own IPv6 addresses,
and run Contiki with 6LoWPAN and uIP stack. They also
embed our IPsec ESP implementation with authentication and
integrity provided by AES-XCBC and encryption provided
by AES-CBC. All motes are connected to the PC via USB,
allowing to monitor and display the data received at every
node.
The demonstration scenario is as follows. The PC sends
private data to one of the motes in the WSN. The PC displays
the original data (the famous Lena portrait) before sending it.
It sends the picture to a 2-hops mote. We display the encrypted
picture as seen by the intermediate mote. The encrypted
picture looks like random noise. The destination node, that has
a IPsec security associate with the Linux machine can decrypt
the cipher-text and get the original picture. The destination
node also verifies the integrity of the picture and can ensure
that the picture was not modified while in transit.
We also measure response time between the source and
destination. This is the time passed when a picture is sent
by the sender, stored by the destination, and received back at
the sender. We measure this time without IPsec, with software-
implemented IPsec, and hardware enabled IPsec. We display
all these times in a table and also as draws charts for com-
parison purpose. We show that hardware support significantly
decreases the response time.
The demonstration shows that motes with limited hardware
can run standard IPsec implementation, enabling end-to-end
secure communications with unmodified Internet hosts. Our
solution leverage IPsec as a well-known standard based on
state of the art cryptographic algorithms.
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
WSNs will be an integral part of the Internet and IPv6 and
6LoWPAN are the protocol standards that are expected to be
used in this context. IPsec is the standard method to secure
Internet communication and we investigate if IPsec can be
extended to sensor networks. We have presented the first IPsec
specification and implementation for 6LoWPAN. We have
extensively evaluated our implementation and demonstrated
that it is possible and feasible to use compressed IPsec to
secure communication between sensor nodes and hosts in the
Internet.
To securely communicate with any IPv6 enabled node
on the Internet pre-shared keys are sufficient but not very
flexible. Therefore, we plan to investigate if an automatic key
exchange protocol for 6LoWPANs based on IPsec’s Internet
Key Exchange protocol (IKE) is feasible.
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